NO. 46237-1-II

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

VS.

NATASHIA R. MEYER,

Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR MASON COURT The Honorable Toni A. Sheldon, Judge Cause No. 13-1-00268-0

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THOMAS E. DOYLE, WSBA NO. 10634 Attorney for Appellant

P.O. Box 510 Hansville, WA 98340 (360) 638-2106

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page					
A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1					
B. ISSUES PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1					
C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE					
D. ARGUMENT					
01. MEYER WAS DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE HER TRIAL ATTORNEY FAILED TO PROPOSE AN INSTRUCTION ON VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION					
02. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHOUT AUTHORITY IN ORDERING MEYER NOT TO FREQUENT PLACES WHOSE PRIMARY BUSINESS IS THE SALE OF LIQUOR					
E. CONCLUSION					

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
State of Washington
State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 156 P.3d 201 (2007)
State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 193 P.3d 678 (2008)
State v. Doogan, 82 Wn. App. 185, 917 P.2d 155 (1996)
<u>State v. Early</u> , 70 Wn. App. 452, 853 P.2d 964 (1993), <u>review denied</u> , 123 Wn.2d 1004 (1994)
<u>State v. Everybodytalksabout</u> , 145 Wn.2d 456,479 39 P.3d 294 (2002)
<u>State v. Gentry</u> , 125 Wn.2d 570, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995)
<u>State v. Gilmore</u> , 76 Wn.2d 293, 456 P.2d 344 (1969)9
<u>State v. Guloy</u> , 104 Wn.2d 412, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985)
State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 896 P.2d 704 (1995)9
State v. Hackett, 64 Wn. App. 780, 827 P.2d 1013 (1992)
<u>State v. Harris</u> , 122 Wn. App. 547, 90 P.3d 1133 (2004)
<u>State v. Henderson</u> , 114 Wn.2d 867, 792 P.2d 514 (1990)9
State v. Jones, 118 Wn. App. 199, 76 P.3d 258 (2003)
State v. May, 100 Wn. App. 478, 997 P.2d 956 (2000)
State v. McKee, 141 Wn. App. 22, 167 P.3d 575 (2007)
<u>State v. Tarica</u> , 59 Wn. App. 368, 798 P.2d 296 (1990)9
State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 743 P.2d 816 (1987)9

<u>State v. Walters</u> , 162 Wn. App. 74, 255 P.3d 835 (2011)
State v. White, 81 Wn.2d 223, 500 P.2d 1242 (1972)9
Federal Cases
<u>Strickland v. Washington</u> , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)
Constitution
Sixth Amendment
Article I, Section 229
<u>Statutes</u>
RCW 9.94A.5331
RCW 9.94A.70316
RCW 9A.32.030
Rules
WPIC 18.10
WPIC 18 20

A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

- 01. The trial court erred in permitting Meyer to be represented by counsel who failed to propose an instruction on voluntary intoxication.
- 02. The trial court erred in imposing a community custody condition prohibiting Meyer from frequenting places whose primary business is the sale of liquor.

B. ISSUES PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

- 01. Whether Meyer was denied her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel where her trial attorney failed to propose an instruction on voluntary intoxication?

 [Assignment of Error No. 1].
- 02. Whether the trial court acted without authority in ordering Meyer not to frequent places whose primary business is the sale of liquor?
 [Assignment of Error No. 2].

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

01. Procedural Facts

Natashia R. Meyer was charged by first amended information filed in Mason County Superior Court June 5, 2013, with premeditated murder in the first degree while armed with a firearm, contrary to RCWs 9A.32.030(1)(a) and 9.94A.533(3). [CP 139-40].

No pretrial motions were heard regarding either a CrR 3.5 or CrR 3.6 hearing. Trial to a jury commenced the following March 14, the Honorable Toni A. Sheldon presiding.

Meyer was found guilty as charged, sentenced within her standard range, including enhancement, and timely notice of this appeal followed. [CP 3-16, 31, 33].

02. Substantive Facts

On the evening of May 28, 2013, 26-year-old

Natashia Meyer was at a trailer owned by Melvin Tuffs that was located
near her camper in Belfair, Washington. [RP 299, 301, 497; CP 139].

Tuffs heard her talking to Sam Blevin on the phone, telling him "his
dinner was ready, come up and eat it." [RP 305]. Shortly thereafter,
between 10:30-11:00, a distraught Meyer called 911 to report she had just
shot Blevin because "[h]e raped me last night." [RP 130; State's Exhibit
51 at 3]. During the call, Meyer admitted she was a drug addict and said
Blevin had insinuated he had given her drugs "to fuck with me." [State's
Exhibit 51 at 15].

I shoot up meth you know a lot like (inaudible) you know I'm a drug addict....

[State's Exhibit 51 at 15].

-

¹ The grammar and punctuation in Meyer's 911 call and subsequent recorded statement at the hospital, as set forth in State's Exhibits 51 and 71, respectively, remain uncorrected to accurately reflect her perception of the related events.

I don't know how many people did it or what but they fucking (inaudible) still seeing tracers² right now, I'm still getting tracers right now and (inaudible).

. . . .

Something that made me completely fall asleep, not even wake up and know it or anything, but he this morning when I we were awake he's like well when are you gonna start shitting all the stuff, and I fucking (inaudible) house, I almost went to the bathroom in my pants and a bunch of like blood and all this stuff coming out and he's just been joking about it like (inaudible) I have no idea but he just. I can't barely walk.

[State's Exhibit 51 at 6].

Oh God I can barely walk now and stuff and it's so weird because I don't I don't even remember (inaudible) I mean I don't have any kind like recollection of even being on any kind of bed or anything and the things that they were saying you know is like oh that's crazy but I don't don't even know what happened. I don't know. I don't remember, I don't even know what they gave me. But I'm still seeing traces and stuff like that.

[State's Exhibit 51 at 13].

Upon arrival at the scene, police located Blevin seated in his vehicle, the victim of multiple gunshot wounds, from which he later died. [RP 274, 283-84]. After advisement and waiver of rights, Meyer said she had been raped by "guys" the night before and that she was "bleeding down there" and had "belly pains." [RP 169]. She admitted to shooting

² At trial, Meyer defined tracer: "Like when people walk or something you could see them again. It's really hard to explain, but like if you go like that really fast with your hand. It was like that in slow motion though, so it was really awkward, really scary. I was really high." [RP 502-03].

Blevin for raping her and that "some people showed up and took (the gun) away, and that's when she called 911 to report what she did." [RP 169]. She also said "she had shot up with meth" about 9:00 p.m., but it was unclear if she meant two or 24 hours earlier. [RP 169-170, 174].

Following transfer to the hospital, Meyer further explained in a recorded statement that she had been at Blevin's residence the previous evening, that they used methamphetamine and shot dope, and that she thought he had given her another drug that rendered her helpless and unable to remember what followed. [State's Exhibit 71 at 5-6, 19]. The next day, Blevins told her she had been raped. [State's Exhibit 71 at 7-8]. "He's talking about (inaudible) being on my face, sleeping and gang raped and all this crazy shit (inaudible)." [State's Exhibit 71 at 20]. She called him later that day "cause he was saying that you know (inaudible) I I just called him and I said will you come, want to come get me and he said yeah." [State's Exhibit 71 at 8]. She admitted she shot him when he arrived. [State's Exhibit 71 at 9-11]. When asked if she shot Blevin because she didn't want him to hurt anyone else, she responded:

I just (inaudible) I don't know (inaudible) I don't know I don't know what I thought honestly I really I really don't but I know that somebody fucking wants to give somebody bad drugs and then makes them you know (inaudible) sex with them (inaudible) sex with Sam you know and uh I don't know, you know what I mean.

[State's Exhibit 71 at 12].

She couldn't remember anything about the rape: "I don't know anything about it, anything. The only thing I know is I'm in a lot of pain a day and he said all day long he's just been saying he did it other than that I I (inaudible) that." [State's Exhibit 71 at 18].

During a sexual assault examination at the hospital, Meyer complained of rectal bleeding and admitted she was on methamphetamine. [RP 186-87]. She had "various bruises on her." [RP 196]. Meyer claimed that Blevin had penetrated her rectally and then laughed with the others when he said he made a video of the rape. [RP 206]. No blood test was requested or taken from Meyer. [RP 207, 468].

Presence of male DNA was found in the perineal and anus areas of Meyer. [RP 226]. And semen was present on the swabs of the perineal and anus areas. [RP 228] A partial Y-STR profile of the anal swab indicated "a mixture of at least two male individuals [RP 243](,)" but no definite conclusion could be reached that the DNA obtained "was from seamen or not" or "when it was or was not deposited there." [RP 247]. The documented literature indicates a period of "potentially up to a week." [RP 247]. "From the anal swabs there were DNA contributions from a least three males." [RP 248].

At trial, Meyer, who has a seventh grade education, explained that she had known Blevin for a year and a half and that she had been hanging out with him at his house, which was two blocks up the street from her camper. [RP 492-93, 497]. "He was a really close friend." "We were doing meth together." [RP 493]. She remembered doing "a load" around 1:00-2:00 in the morning but didn't remember going to sleep. [RP 494]. "I was very intoxicated." [RP 494]. She remembered Blevin saying really crude things:

[A]bout going to the bathroom in my pants, about being filthy, you know, sexual stuff not really necessarily directed towards me but enough for me to wonder why he was saying those things.

[RP 496].

Later that day, at band practice,

[Blevin] was saying how stupid she was for not even F-ing knowing that she was but-F'd, and at the time I really started feeling like they were talking about me, you know ... He was talking about going to the bathroom in my pants. He was talking about me being gang-banged. Horrible things.

[RP 499].

Meyer walked home. "I was hysterical. I was crying. I felt really bad. I mean, I just, I couldn't believe what was going on." [RP 500-01].

I got to my camper and grabbed some clothes to bring to Nova's (older woman friend) to take a bath and stuff. At that time I felt an uncontrollable desire to go to the

bathroom, like never before. I usually go to the bathroom in Mel's house but at this time if I went to use the bathroom there I wouldn't have made it. I had to grab, unfortunately — I'm sorry to say this, but — my dog's food bowl. I dumped it out; I put it in my toilet and I went to the bathroom.

And it wasn't like bathroom; it was like soap, reddish bloody-looking soapy – it smelled like soap. It was something that – I mean, I had never seen before. And at that time I knew for sure that I was raped.

RP 501].

She then went to Mel Tuffs's trailer and called Blevin to get a ride to Nova's house, but he said he had already left. [RP 502]. She was crying and Mel was asking her what was wrong. "I didn't know how to tell an eighty-six-year-old man that somebody is saying he anally raped me." [RP 501].

[A]ll I could think about is killing myself. I just wanted to die. I mean, I have made Mel's bed quite a bit. I knew he had a pistol in there. I considered killing myself at this time. I can't stop drugs. Now the only people that I had are saying these things. I wanted to get to Nova's so bad. I was seeing tracers, like – I mean, I felt worse than I've - -

[RP 502]. "I was really high." "Higher than I've ever been in thirteen years of using meth." [RP 503].

When Blevin pulled into the driveway, Meyer grabbed Tuffs's pistol and went outside. [RP 503-04]. "I was fearful because he said he wasn't coming." [RP 508]. She denied inviting him for dinner and didn't

expect him to show up. [RP 508]. She walked straight to the car and opened the passenger door. [RP 511].

I just wanted him to know what he did was wrong. I mean, I love Sam. I really love Sam, and at the time I was out of my mind, just out of my mind. And I was scared. The gun was falling apart and by the time I got it — and when I finally made that first shot it was clear that I had shot him in maybe the throat or the - -

[RP 504].

I started shooting again and again after that. I just – I don't know if I could say that I lost my mind or if I wanted to put him out of his misery. It was something that I can't explain. It was horrible.

[RP 505].

D. ARGUMENT

01. MEYER WAS DENIED HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHERE HER TRIAL
ATTORNEY FAILED TO PROPOSE
AN INSTRUCTION ON VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION.

Every criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Washington State Constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 229, 743 P.2d 816 (1987). A criminal defendant claiming ineffective assistance must prove (1) that the attorney's performance was deficient, i.e., that the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms, and (2) that prejudice resulted from the deficient performance, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceedings would have been different. State v. Early, 70 Wn. App. 452, 460, 853 P.2d 964 (1993), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1004 (1994); State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 56, 896 P.2d 704 (1995). Competency of counsel is determined based on the entire record below. State v. White, 81 Wn.2d 223, 225, 500 P.2d 1242 (1972) (citing State v. Gilmore, 76 Wn.2d 293, 456 P.2d 344 (1969)). A reviewing court is not required to address both prongs of the test if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one prong. State v. Tarica, 59 Wn. App. 368, 374, 798 P.2d 296 (1990).

Additionally, while the invited error doctrine precludes review of error caused by the defendant, <u>See State v. Henderson</u>, 114 Wn.2d 867, 870, 792 P.2d 514 (1990), the same doctrine does not act as a bar to review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. <u>State v. Doogan</u>, 82

Wn. App. 185, 917 P.2d 155 (1996) (citing State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 646, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995)).

"A criminal defendant is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction if: (1) one of the elements of the crime charged is a particular mental state; (2) there is substantial evidence [that the defendant] ingest[ed] an intoxicant; and (3) the defendant presents evidence that this activity affected his ability to acquire the required mental state." State v. Harris, 122 Wn. App. 547, 552, 90 P.3d 1133 (2004) (citing State v. Everybodytalksabout, 145 Wn.2d 456, 460, 479 39 P.3d 294 (2002)). Voluntary intoxication includes intoxication from alcohol or drugs. State v. Hackett, 64 Wn. App. 780, 784-85, 827 P.2d 1013 (1992).

"In evaluating whether the evidence is sufficient to support a jury instruction on an affirmative defense, the court must interpret it most strongly in favor of the defendant and must not weigh the proof or judge the witnesses' credibility, which are exclusive functions of the jury." State v. May, 100 Wn. App. 478, 482, 997 P.2d 956 (2000). RCW 9A.16.090 recognizes that where a crime has a "particular mental state," voluntary intoxication "may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state," id., which is addressed in 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE:

WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 18.10, at 282 (3d ed 2008):

No act committed by a person in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of that condition. However, evidence of intoxication may be considered in determining whether the defendant [acted] [or] [failed to act] with (fill in requisite mental state).³

id.

To prove the charge of murder in the first degree under RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) the State had to prove, in part, that Meyer acted with premeditated intent to cause the death of Blevin. [CP 139]. During presentation of the case, substantial evidence was produced that Meyer was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the incident and that she exhibited sufficient effects of the methamphetamine from which a rationale juror could logically conclude that her intoxication affected her ability to think and act in accord with the requisite mental state when she committed the crime, especially given that "physical manifestations of intoxication provide sufficient evidence from which to

-

³ WPIC 18.10 limits the focus to simply whether intoxication, standing alone, interfered with Meyer's ability to premeditate and/or intend the offense, and should not be confused with WPIC 18.20, which permits a jury to take into consideration "[e]vidence of a mental illness or disorder" for the purpose of "determining whether the defendant had the capacity to form" the requisite mental state. WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 18.20, at 286 (3d ed 2008). Not to put too fine a point on it, WPIC 18.10 tells the jury that Meyer's shooting of Blevin is not "less criminal" if she did it while voluntarily intoxicated, though her intoxication—and only her intoxication—may be taken into account in determining her mental capacity. In contrast, WPIC 18.20, permits a jury to consider a defendant's mental disorder in determining whether such disorder prohibited the defendant from forming the requisite intent. Meyer was precluded from relying on WPIC 18.20, given her expert's opinion that she was not psychotic. As stated by her counsel: "He did the interview and evaluation toward determining whether or not there was diminished capacity or insanity at the time of the incident, and he determined there was not." [RP 62].

infer that mental processing also was affected...." State v. Walters, 162 Wn. App. 74, 83, 255 P.3d 835 (2011). During the 911 call, Meyer admitted using meth [State's Exhibit 51 at 16] and said she was "still getting tracers right now." [State's Exhibit 51 at 6]. When initially contacted at the scene by Corporal William Reed, she admitted she had recently "shot up with meth." [RP 169-170]. When forensic nurse Bonnie McReynolds, who treated Meyer at the hospital, was asked if Meyer appeared to be under the influence of any type of drug, she responded: "Certainly, I think she was rambling a lot and kind of conversation jumped around a lot, so certainly it's – thought that was possible. [RP 187]. Meyers told McReynolds "she was on methamphetamine." [RP 187]. Detective Jeffrey Rhoades, who interviewed Meyers at the hospital, believed that Meyer was under the influence of methamphetamine "based on her speech patterns, the manner in which she spoke. She, again, was displaying mood swings. Often times when asked a question she would kind of go off on tangents at times and would have to be brought back on task." [RP 324-25]. "Again, the manner in which she was speaking, the manner in which she was acting and her own admission that she had been using meth." [RP 357]. "She was displaying symptoms consistent with meth use; yes." [RP 357]. In the recorded statement Meyer gave Rhoades

she offered that she's "still a mess with my drugs like really bad, I mean." [State's Exhibit 71 at 28].

After speaking with Rhoades [RP 398], Meyers was observed by Dr. Bessie McCann while the sexual assault nurse questioned her. [RP 393]. "[S]he had trouble focusing on what we were talking about. She seemed to get distracted by her thoughts." [RP 394]. "She said that she and [Blevin] had spent some time together the night before and had done methamphetamine, and she admitted to using that." [RP 395]. "She seemed like she might still be a little bit high still because she was speaking very quickly and she had a lot of, like, fidgety movements with her hands." [RP 398]. "The span of about three or four hours of time, this whole ED (emergency department) course, and she came in jittery, seeming like she might still be high; it was obvious methamphetamine influence." [RP 408].

The record does not, and could not, reveal any tactical or strategic reason why trial counsel failed to propose an instruction on voluntary intoxication, and it is difficult to understand counsel's lack of action in light of his closing argument, wherein he discussed Meyer's drug addiction at length: "She's a drug addict." [RP 619]. "She's high on drugs. She's a drug addict." [RP 619]. "[S]he's still under the influence of methamphetamine." [RP 621]. "You have to remember all that she was

through that day. We're not talking about over a month's period of time or a year's period of time. We're talking twenty-four hours...." [RP 623-24]. It was not legitimate trial strategy to fail to propose an instruction on voluntary intoxication.

Under the specific facts of this case, the prejudice is clear, for a voluntary intoxication defense was Meyer's only chance for acquittal or conviction on the lesser offense of murder in the second degree. Without the involuntary intoxication instruction, the jury was precluded from this consideration or any meaningful deliberation of Meyer's mental state visà-vis the lesser degree offense. Because there was substantial evidence of Meyer's intoxication and how it could affect her ability to think and act in accord with the requisite mental state, the trial court, if requested, could properly have given the instruction. Given there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have differed had defense counsel sought the instruction, the error was not harmless, with the result that Meyer received ineffective assistance of counsel and reversal and remand is required.

//

//

//

//

02. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHOUT AUTHORITY IN ORDERING MEYER NOT TO FREQUENT PLACES WHOSE PRIMARY BUSINESS IS THE SALE OF LIQUOR.

As a condition of community custody, the court

ordered that Meyer:

... shall not go into bars, taverns, lounges, or other places whose primary business is the sale of liquor;

[CP 14].

"In the context of sentencing, established case law holds that illegal or erroneous sentences may be challenged for the first time on appeal." State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 744, 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (quoting State v. Ford, 37 Wn.2d 472, 477, 973 P.2d 452 (1999)). This court reviews whether a trial court had statutory authority to impose community custody conditions de novo. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).

There was no evidence at trial that alcohol played any part in Meyer's crime. In <u>State v. Jones</u>, 118 Wn. App. 199, 76 P.3d 258 (2003), the defendant pleaded guilty to several offenses and the court imposed conditions of community custody relating to alcohol consumption and treatment. As here, nothing in the record indicated that alcohol contributed to Jones's offenses. Id. at 207-08. This court found that although the trial

court had authority to prohibit consumption of alcohol, it did not have the authority to order the defendant "to participate in alcohol counseling(,)" Id. at 208, reasoning that the legislature intended a trial court to be able "to prohibit the consumption of alcohol regardless of whether alcohol had contributed to the offense." Id. at 206. In contrast, when ordering participation in treatment or counseling, the treatment or counseling must be related to the crime. Id. at 207-08; see also State v. McKee, 141 Wn. App. 22, 34, 167 P.3d 575 (2007) (community custody provisions prohibiting purchasing and possession of alcohol invalid where alcohol did not play a role in the crime), reviewed denied, 163 Wn.2d 1049 (2008). And while RCW 9.94A.703(3)(e), authorizes the sentencing court to order that an offender refrain from consuming alcohol, there is no such authority forbidding an offender from frequenting places whose primary business is the sale of liquor, sans any evidence and argument that it qualifies as a crime-related prohibition under RCW 9.94A.703, which constitutes "an order of a court prohibiting conduct that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted...." RCW 9.94A.030(10).

The condition prohibiting Meyer from frequenting places selling liquor is invalid because there was no evidence that alcohol played any

part in her offense, with the result that it is not a crime-related prohibition and must be stricken.

E. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, Meyer respectfully requests this court to reverse her conviction and remand for a new trial or to remand for resentencing.

DATED this 12th day of December 2014.

THOMAS E. DOYLE
Attorney for Appellant

WSBA NO. 10634

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I served a copy of the above brief on this date as follows:

Tim Higgs Natashia R. Meyer #356449

timh@co.mason.wa.us W.C.C.C.

Unit CCU - East

9601 Bujacich Road NW Gig Harbor, WA 98332

DATED this 12th day of December 2014.

THOMAS E. DOYLE

Momas E. Doyle

Attorney for Appellant WSBA NO. 10634

DOYLE LAW OFFICE

December 12, 2014 - 4:29 PM

Transmittal Letter

Document Uploaded:	6-462371-Appellant's Brief.pdf			
Case Name: Court of Appeals Case Number:	State v. Mey 46237-1	er		
Is this a Personal Restraint F	Petition?	Yes		No
The document being Filed	is:			
Designation of Clerk's P		Suppler	men	tal Designation of Clerk's Paper
Statement of Arrangem Motion:	ents			
Answer/Reply to Motion	ı:			
Brief: <u>Appellant's</u>				
Statement of Additional	Authorities			
Cost Bill				
Objection to Cost Bill				
Affidavit				
Letter				
Copy of Verbatim Report Hearing Date(s):		ngs - No.	. of '	Volumes:
Personal Restraint Petit	ion (PRP)			
Response to Personal R	estraint Petiti	ion		
Reply to Response to Pe	ersonal Restra	aint Petiti	ion	
Petition for Review (PR\	/)			
Other:				
Comments:				
No Comments were entered				
Sender Name: Thomas E Do	oyle - Email: <u>t</u>	ed9@me	e.cor	<u>n</u>
A copy of this document l	has been em	nailed to	the	e following addresses:

timh@co.mason.wa.us